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Abstract
Background: Despite widespread implementation of syndromic surveillance systems within public health agencies,
previous studies of the implementation and use of these systems have indicated that the functions and responses
taken in response to syndromic surveillance data vary widely according to local context and preferences. The
objective of the Syndromic Surveillance Evaluation Study was to develop and implement standardized supports in
local public health agencies in Ontario, Canada, and evaluate the ability of these supports to affect actions taken as
part of public health communicable disease control programs.
Methods: Local public health agencies (LPHA) in Ontario, which used syndromic surveillance based on emergency
department visits for respiratory disease, were recruited and randomly allocated to the study intervention or control
group. The intervention group health agencies received standardized supports in terms of a standardized aberrant
event detection algorithm and a response protocol dictating steps to investigate and assess the public health
significance of syndromic surveillance alerts. The control group continued with their pre-existing syndromic
surveillance infrastructure and processes. Outcomes were assessed using logbooks, which collected quantitative and
qualitative information about alerts received, investigation steps taken, and public health responses. The study was
conducted prospectively for 15 months (October 2013 to February 2015).
Results: Fifteen LPHAs participated in the study (n = 9 intervention group, n = 6 control group). A total of 1,969
syndromic surveillance alerts were received by all LPHAs. Variations in the types and amount of responses varied by
LPHA, in particularly differences were noted by the size of the health unit. Smaller health units had more challenges
to both detect and mount a response to any alerts. LPHAs in the control group were more likely to declare alerts
to have public health significance and to initiate any action. Regression models using repeated measures
showed an interaction between the year (Year 1 versus Year 2) and the intervention as well as an interaction
between year and sustained nature of the alert. Both of these were linked to the control health units
reporting more “watchful waiting”.
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Conclusions: This study raises questions about the effectiveness of using standardized protocols to improve
the performance of syndromic surveillance in a decentralized public health system. Despite efforts to create
standardized protocols and engage public health agencies in the process, no significant differences in the
effective use of syndromic alerts were observed beyond year 1. It also raises questions about the minimum
capacity of the agency and minimum population size that are required for an effective response.
Background
Syndromic surveillance, defined as the use of pre-
diagnostic data for surveillance purposes, has risen in
prominence and acceptance as part of standard practice
in public health surveillance [1, 2]. Despite some early
detractors [3, 4], implementation of these systems began
to gain traction from the introduction of anti-bioterrorism
public health programming in the 2000s [5–7]. While the
originally intended functions of syndromic surveillance
were to support early detection and response to commu-
nicable disease outbreaks, their utility has expanded since
that time to support situational awareness, to provide
value to public health staff in having a “continuously
acquired” data source of pre-diagnostic information, to
provide reassurance that an outbreak or aberrant event is
not occurring particularly during mass gatherings, and to
augment existing surveillance infrastructure [8, 9]. Many
of these roles are relevant to non-communicable as well
as communicable disease surveillance.
While the span and scope of syndromic surveillance has
expanded since its inception, evaluations of syndromic
surveillance have focused on syndromic surveillance sys-
tems’ ability to detect known or simulated communicable
disease outbreaks [10–12]. Due to the challenges of deter-
mining an appropriate level of sensitivity and specificity of
aberration detection algorithms, considerable effort has
also been placed on such optimization of statistical algo-
rithms [13]. In comparison, we note that few studies have
prospectively assessed the impact of syndromic surveil-
lance on outcomes beyond outbreak detection, and even
fewer have investigated how syndromic surveillance sys-
tems for infectious diseases are employed in local public
health professional practice.
Studies on the experiences of using syndromic surveil-
lance systems to inform public health actions have
shown high uptake but wide variation in application. In
the United States, studies have shown that between 80
and 94% of state health departments have at least one
syndromic surveillance system in operation but there
was variation in terms of the data sources used [14, 15].
In addition, some states had centralized systems while
others were decentralized [14, 15]. In Ontario, Canada,
53% (20/38) of public health organizations use syndromic
surveillance systems for infectious disease surveillance
[16]. Subsequent work in Ontario, which assessed the use
of syndromic surveillance systems during the 2009
H1N1 influenza pandemic, demonstrated a wide vari-
ation in the uses, procedures, and corresponding public
health actions in response to syndromic alerts [17, 18]
in this decentralized system.
The objective of this study was to determine whether
the development and implementation of standardized
supports, consisting of a standardized method for de-
tecting aberrant events and a standardized response
protocol for handling such events, were able to support
more effective use of syndromic surveillance emergency
department data for infectious respiratory diseases com-
pared to usual practices.
Methods
Setting and study participants
In Ontario, Canada, there are 36 local public health agen-
cies (LPHAs) that each provides public health program-
ming for a distinct jurisdiction. The populations served
vary widely between over 2 million residents in the largest
agency to under 200,000 residents in the smallest. While
Ontario LPHAs must meet standards for providing public
health services, including infectious and communicable
disease control [19], the use of syndromic surveillance is
not a provincial requirement. Each health agency inde-
pendently decides if they wish to implement syndromic
surveillance systems. Of the possible syndromic data
sources, syndromes based on aggregated presenting com-
plaints to emergency departments are most commonly
used [20, 21]. One such system, called the ‘Acute Care
Enhanced Surveillance System’ (ACES), is used by the
majority of Ontario LPHAs, but some agencies administer
their own systems [22].
Study design, participant recruitment, and experimental
allocation
This study takes a cluster randomized study design,
where the level of study participant is the Ontario
LPHA. LPHAs eligible to participate were those that
self-identified as regular users of emergency department
syndromic surveillance systems within their communic-
able disease programs. We recruited study participants
by providing each agency’s Medical Officers of Health
with an information letter and invitation to participate.
Next, consenting LPHAs were allocated to either the
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intervention or control arms of the study. In order to
balance the intervention and control groups to contain
health units with a similar distribution of population
sizes served, LPHAs were ranked by size of the popula-
tion served, alternately assigned a code of “0” or “1”.
Based on a coin flip, agencies in the “0” group were
assigned to be the control arm, and those in the “1”
group assigned the intervention group.
Study interventions: development and implementation of
the study algorithm and protocol
The study team developed two standardized support
interventions: (1) a standard aberration detection algo-
rithm for application to emergency department visit
data, and (2) a standard response protocol to guide
communicable disease staff in investigating and acting
on syndromic surveillance alerts. The interventions were
developed in a participatory fashion where the research
team received significant input from the local commu-
nicable disease staff throughout the process [23].
To develop the standardized aberration detection algo-
rithm, we acquired 3 years of historical emergency room
visit data for respiratory syndrome and influenza-like-
illness from each LPHA. Based on these data, a linear
regression model was developed to adjust for seasonal fac-
tors as well as factors such as the day of the week. The cu-
mulative sum (CUSUM) method applied to differences
between the observed number of visits and that predicted
by the regression model. [24, 25]. The study team held a
face-to face meeting of representatives from the interven-
tion arm health agencies, in order to choose the best
model and elicit feedback regarding the algorithms’ rela-
tive sensitivity and specificity. As a result of this exercise,
we determined that the study participants preferred the al-
gorithm to be more specific than sensitive. More details
on the algorithm development can be found in Appendix.
The second component of the study intervention
consisted of developing and implementing a protocol to
guide health agency communicable disease staff in hand-
ling and acting upon syndromic surveillance events. The
protocol was based on the findings from a review of
peer-reviewed and gray literature. Two of the most
relevant documents were a study by Usher-Pines et al.
[26] and the results of a consensus document [27]. A
face-to-face meeting of representatives from the inter-
vention LPHAs was used to reach consensus on the
components of the response protocol. The protocol
consisted of 3 phases: (1) checking whether the syn-
dromic alert could be attributed to an alternate ex-
planation, such as data misclassification, missing or
duplicated data, etc., (2) validating the alert epidemiolog-
ically by assessing clustering by person, place, and time,
and (3) assessing the public health significance of the
syndromic alert in the context of other information.
Intervention implementation
The standardized supports were implemented in inter-
vention LPHAs between October 2013 and February
2015. During this period, LPHAs in the intervention
group: (1) received additional weekly reports of alerts
generated by the standardized aberration detection algo-
rithm applied to the data for the respective LPHA, and
(2) were asked to apply the steps outlined in the stand-
ard protocol for investigating all syndromic alerts re-
ceived. Due to feasibility issues regarding data transfer
to the research team who applied the standard aber-
ration detection algorithm, study-generated syndromic
alerts were approximately one week late in being
disseminated to the intervention LPHAs. Since we had
no evidence that the study-generated algorithm was
more effective than each LPHA’s existing algorithms,
intervention arm health agencies were instructed to
continue to receive alerts from existing syndromic
surveillance systems. Meanwhile, control LPHAs contin-
ued with their usual practices in regards to receiving,
investigating and responding to syndromic alerts from
their existing syndromic surveillance systems for de-
tecting aberrant events.
Given the nature of the intervention, blinding was not
possible. In order to minimize contamination, interven-
tion LPHA staff were asked not to share details pertain-
ing to the study-generated algorithms or about the
response protocols with public health colleagues in
control LPHAs.
Data sources and study variables
All emergency department data systems relied on triage
diagnoses provided at the time of patient registration at
the emergency department. While ACES is used by most
LPHAs, a few LPHAs have their own systems. Coding of
the respiratory and ILI syndromes was assessed and,
while not exactly the same, were felt to be sufficiently
similar.
As our primary data collection mechanism, we used
logbooks which were completed by relevant LPHA staff.
The logbooks consisted of pre-programmed Excel work-
sheets that collected information about syndromic sur-
veillance alerts received by LPHAs. For each alert, the
LPHA staff recorded the investigative steps taken and
any public health responses initiated. The logbooks
contained two categorical fields (i.e. “Was a public
health response warranted?” and “Did your response lead
to detection of an outbreak?”) and multiple free-text
fields. The latter provided narrative comments on the
investigative steps and actions taken. At the end of the
logbook data collection period, we held semi-structured
interviews by telephone with each of the participating
LPHAs’ study contacts in order to validate information
in the logbooks, to verify the absence of study
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contamination, and to gain a better understanding of the
reasons for some of the reported responses and non-
responses. The interviews were recorded and transcribed
verbatim, forming a qualitative data source to corrobor-
ate the information provided in the logbooks.
The outcome measures of “effective use” of syndromic
surveillance data were initially defined in terms of two
categorical variables. These were the (1) number of
alerts that were perceived to warrant a public health
response, and (2) the number of alerts that led to the
detection of an outbreak or signalled the start of the
influenza season. The research team also coded the text
fields in order to create the appropriate outcome vari-
ables. These outcomes were: (A) the number of alerts
with results communicated internally within the LPHA,
(B) the number of alerts with results communicated to
external entities such as hospitals, and (C) “watchful
waiting”, defined as reassessment of syndromic alert
results the following day. “Watchful waiting” was not
originally included as a valid outcome. However, since
many LPHA’s reported “watchful waiting” as an action, it
was included in the analysis. Upon preliminary analysis
of the logbooks, it became apparent that the variable
“perceived to warrant a public health response” was
often missing and frequently not related to what was
listed in the open text fields. Following-up interviews
with the LPHAs revealed that the open text fields more
accurately reflected their actions.
The primary independent variables were: the alloca-
tion status of the LPHA to the study intervention or
control group, the “size of the LPHA according to
population served” (categories: large health unit, popu-
lation > 400,000; medium health unit, population be-
tween 150,000 and 399,999; and small health unit,
population less than 150,000), “nature of alert with
respect to being new or sustained” (categories: “new
alert”, characterizing an alert whose results had not
previously been seen; “sustained alert”, characterizing
an alert whose results were felt to be related to an alert
received previously). Small LPHAs were more likely to
rely on one hospital as their reporting source and have
number of visits per day to each hospital. They also
have staff providing only part-time support to the
syndromic surveillance program. Post-hoc predictor
variables that were felt to be important upon prelimin-
ary logbook analysis were: “year of the study” (categor-
ies: Year 1, October 14, 2013- August 30, 2014; Year 2,
September 1, 2014 - February 27, 2015), as well as
whether or not the LPHA’s communicable disease staff
perceived that syndromic data was a primary source of
surveillance information to inform public health action
(categories: yes, no).
The final dataset contained the categorical information
captured in the logbooks (outbreak detected (yes/no)),
additional numerical variables derived from inductive
thematic analysis of the free-text fields within the log-
books themselves, as well as variable from the inductive
thematic analysis of concepts that arose in semi-
structured interviews (i.e. whether the LPHA considered
syndromic surveillance primary) [28, 29].
Data analysis
We generated descriptive statistics to characterize syn-
dromic alerts received by the LPHAs, as well as corre-
sponding investigative steps and public health actions
taken, describing categorical variables using frequencies
and proportions.
Due to each LPHA replicating the same internal
process for each alert, no statistical tests were applied to
the descriptive results. Accordingly, logistic regression
models with random effects accounting for repeated ob-
servations from LPHAs were used in order to assess the
impact of the independent variables on the outcomes.
Variables included in the regression were based on a
conceptual model regardless of their statistical signifi-
cance on the outcome. Since the effect of the small and
medium public health authorities may be different, alerts
from each were each coded as separate dummy variables
with the large LPHA was used as the reference point.
Similarly, new alerts were coded as the reference point
for sustained alerts.
Study protocol modifications
The study was intended to run from October 2013 to
August 2014. However, a severe ice storm struck
Ontario at the end of December 2013 and, during this
time, syndromic surveillance reporting systems were
disrupted. While the data were retrospectively populated
in the system, the potential for a real-time response to
alerts was lost. This storm also happened to coincide
with the peak of Influenza A activity in 2013 [30]. As a
result, all participating public health units were asked
to extend the study for an additional five months until
the end of February 2015. Only one LPHA declined to
participate in this extension but its data are included
in the year 1 analysis. During this extended phase
(Year 2) of the study, Ontario experienced a severe in-




Random allocation of the 16 participating LPHAs resulted
in 9 LPHAs in the intervention group and 6 LPHAs in the
control group (Table 1). The original allocation was 8 and
7. However, since one control LPHA conducted only
school absenteeism surveillance, it was excluded from this
portion of the study. Finally, one LPHA volunteered after
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the initial allocation had occurred, and was assigned ran-
domly separately. Based on this coin flip, it was assigned
to the intervention group.
Thirteen (13) LHPAs used data from the ACES
emergency department visit syndromic surveillance
system [31], while two health units had LPHA spe-
cific systems (Table 1). By chance, the two LPHAs
with their own detection systems were allocated by
chance to the control group.
Dataset development via inductive thematic analysis
To develop the dataset that was used for regression ana-
lysis, inductive thematic analysis of the logbook data was
necessary to extract key themes that were subsequently
used to derive numerical variables [28]. Two authors
(LAR, RDS) independently coded logbook data received
for October 2013 to June 2014, and compared results.
Disagreements were resolved via discussion with a third
author (ILJ). The Kappa score for inter-observer agree-
ment was 0.70. All data following June 2014 were coded
by one author (LAR).
Characterization of aberrant events received by public
health unit study participants
A total of 1,969 alerts were included in the study
from October 2013 to February 2015. The control
LPHAs reported receiving 1,027 alerts while the inter-
vention LPHAs reported receiving 942 alerts (Table 2).
Of the total, 789 were for respiratory syndrome, and
1,180 were for the influenza-like illness (ILI) syn-
drome. Five hundred and twenty eight alerts (26%),
were classified as new alerts while 1,431 (73%) were
classified as sustained. Fifty nine percent (59%) of
alerts were seen in study Year 2, between September
2014 and February 2015 (n = 1,168). Two hundred
and twelve (11%) alerts were generated by the study-
developed standard algorithm.
Steps taken to investigate syndromic surveillance
aberrant events
In order to assess the degree to which the study-
developed standard response protocol was implemented
in the LPHAs, the steps taken in the investigation of each






(n of health units)
Population served by the LPHAs
Large (Population > 400,000) 7 4 3
Medium (Population 150,000 to 399,999) 5 3 2
Small (Population < 150,000 3 2 1
Emergency department syndromic system
ACES system 13 9 4
LPHA specific system 2 0 2
Total 15 9 6
Table 2 Characterization of the investigative activities taken regarding syndromic alerts, serving as a process evaluation measure
Total (n, alerts) Intervention group (n, alerts) Control group (n, alerts)
Alerts received by local public health agency study participants 1969 942 1027
Year 1 801 409 392
Year 2 1168 533 635
Alerts checked for data misclassification, data stream issues,
or error-related issues
305 (15%) 224 (24%) 81 (8%)
Year 1 193 (24%) 156 (38%) 37 (9%)
Year 2 112 (10%) 68 (13%) 44 (7%)
Alerts checked for epidemiological clustering 1538 (78%) 664 (70%) 874 (85%)
Year 1 635 (79%) 253 (62%) 382 (97%)
Year 2 903 (77%) 411 (77%) 492 (77%)
Alerts warranting public health action 714 (36%) 165 (18%) 549 (53%)
Year 1 319 (40%) 11 (3%) 308 (79%)
Year 2 395 (34%) 154 (29%) 241 (38%)
Missing 380 (19%) 168 (18%) 212 (21%)
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alert were assessed in both the intervention and control
LPHAs. Intervention LPHAs reported a higher frequency
of assessing syndromic alerts for alternative explanations
compared to control LPHAs, 24% of the alerts compared
to 8% respectively (Table 2). This effect varied by the
size of LPHA, where those serving a larger population
(population size > 400,000) more frequently looked for
alternative explanations. The proportions for medium
and small-sized health agencies and in year 2 of the
study were similar to the proportions observed in the con-
trol LPHAs. All LPHAs were more likely to look for alter-
native explanations in new alerts than sustained alerts.
Control LPHAs were more likely to investigate the
alerts for epidemiological clustering by assessing for
temporal, spatial, and demographic trends. The pro-
portion of alerts being investigated for epidemiological
clustering was relatively constant across all control
LPHAs, but the proportion declined from approximately
80% among Intervention LPHAs serving large popula-
tions to 55% those serving a small population.
LPHA responses to syndromic surveillance aberrant
events
Information on the public health significance of an alert
was difficult to assess, since 19% of the responses were
missing. For 16% of instances where a response was
reported as being warranted, no action was reported in
the free text field. Similarly for situations where a public
health response was indicated as not warranted, 38%
reported a public health action in the free text fields.
Based on these challenges, this variable was not used in
further analyses.
Logbook thematic analysis indicated that syndromic
alerts informed a breadth of public health actions, illus-
trated in Fig. 1. Using these definitions, there were 946
(48%) instances reported overall of any public health
action being taken, with 382 (41% of all alerts) for the
intervention LPHAs and 564 (55% of all alerts) for
control LPHAs. The number of responses was lowest in
the intervention LPHAs in year 1 of the study, between
October 2013 and August 2014 (Table 3).
In terms of outbreak detection, there were no out-
breaks reported as detected by alerts from syndromic
surveillance during the study period. Two LPHAs, with
one in the intervention group and one in the control
group, reported that syndromic alerts helped reassure
them that the influenza season had begun but the actual
decision was made using other data (a combination of
school absenteeism syndromic surveillance and labora-
tory testing for influenza).
Of the reported public health responses in response to
syndromic alerts, the most common action was “watchful
waiting”. This activity corresponded to approximately one
third of all the alerts and two thirds of the reported actions
taken. The other responses of providing internal notification
within the health agency regarding details about the syn-
dromic alert (“notifying internally”), or sharing details about
the syndromic alert with external groups such as hospital
partners (“notifying externally”) were much lower at 15 and
9% respectively. No difference was observed between study
generated alerts and those generated by their systems.
Predictors of outcomes related to public health responses
to syndromic alerts
Logistic regression models confirmed the descriptive
results, where control LPHAs reported significantly more
overall responses even when the models adjusted for popu-
lation size served by the LPHA. The analysis also showed
an interaction between the year (Year 1 versus Year 2) and
the intervention as well as an interaction between year and
sustained nature of the alert. As a result, Table 4 shows the
regression models by year. The effect of the intervention
was more pronounced in year 1 with large LPHAs in the
intervention group showing fewer responses to the alerts
Fig. 1 Illustration of the breadth of public health actions taken in response to emergency department respiratory syndromic visit alerts by Ontario
public health units, October 2013-February 2015
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than control LPHAs. This effect was less in year 2. In year
1, LPHAs were more likely to respond to sustained alerts
but this effect was reversed in year 2, mainly due to the in-
crease in the “watchful waiting” response to the first alert.
No significant results were seen for the medium or small
LPHAs.
The post-hoc-generated logistic regression model that
included a variable for whether LPHA staff perceived
syndromic data as a primary source of information
showed that those agencies who perceive syndromic
surveillance as a primary source of data were much more
likely to report any type of response to an alert in year 1
of the study but not year 2. However, when the term for
“watchful waiting” is excluded from public health re-
sponse, the results were not significant (Table 5).
Discussion
Main findings
The results of this study confirm the variation in ap-
proaches to syndromic surveillance as reported in
Table 3 Characterization of the types of responses initiated regarding 545 syndromic alerts, serving as an outcome evaluation
measure
Total (n, alerts) Intervention group (n, alerts) Control group (n, alerts)
Number of alerts 1,969 942 1,027
Year 1 801 409 392
Year 2 1,168 533 625
Any action 946 (48%) 382 (41%) 564 (55%)
Year 1 397 (50%) 74 (18%) 323 (82%)
Year 2 549 (47%) 308 (58%) 241 (38%)
Watchful waiting 647 (33%) 263 (28%) 384 (37%)
Year 1 275 (34%) 18 (4%) 257 (66%)
Year 2 372 (32%) 245 (46%) 127 (20%)
Internal notification 297 (15%) 146 (15%) 151 (15%)
Year 1 109 (14%) 55 (13%) 54 (14%)
Year2 188 (16%) 91 (17%) 97 (15%)
External notification 171 (9%) 84 (9%) 87 (8%)
Year 1 66 (8%) 5 (1%) 61 (16%)
Year 2 105 (9%) 79 (15%) 26 (4%)
Table 4 Multivariable logistic regression models that account for repeated measures assessing the association between specified
predictor variables and likelihood of taking a public health response to emergency department syndromic surveillance alerts by year
within the study
Outcomes
(Odds Ratio, 95% Confidence Interval)
Any response Any response excluding watchful waiting Watchful waiting Internal notification External notification
Intervention Year 1 0.024 (<0.01, 0.51)a 0.43 (0.06, 2.92) 0.04 (0.001, 1.58) 2.94 (0.12, 72.2) 0.04 (<0.01, 0.37)a
Year 2 0.20 (0.02, 2.38) 0.69 (0.16, 3.03) 0.19 (<0.01, 55.8) 0.98 (0.08, 12.4) 1.27 (0.19, 8.34)
Control Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Medium LPHA Year 1 0.83 (0.15, 45.9) 0.91 (0.06, 1.39) 4.25 (0.04, 423) 0.35 (0.01, 21.2) 3.66 (0.18, 74.0)
Year 2 0.29 (0.012, 7.12) 0.45 (0.06, 3.2) 11.7 (0.009, 15,000) 0.78 (0.04, 17.5) 1.18 (0.10, 13.9)
Large LPHA Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Small LPHA Year 1 0.352 (0.13, 9.30) 1.02 (0.12, 8.44) 1.28 (0.02, 69.2) 0.61 (0.02, 15.9) 3.83 (0.29, 50.5)
Year 2 1.65 (0.11, 24.0) 0.56 (0.11, 2.86) 32.1 (0.05, 19,908) 0.19 (0.01, 3.33) 1.62 (0.21, 12.6)
Large LPHA Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
Sustained alert Year 1 1.81 (1.10, 2.99)a 2.06 (1.23, 3.45)a 0.62 (0.24, 1.56) 2.21 (1.27, 3.84)a 7.83 (3.2, 19.2)a
Year 2 0.24 (0.16, 0.35)a 0.92 (0.61, 1.39) 0.15 (0.10, 0.23)a 0.75 (0.47, 1.19) 0.59 (0.37, 0.94)a
New alert Reference Reference Reference Reference Reference
aStatistically significant result
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previous studies [14–16]. In a survey of public health
staff from United States state and local health agen-
cies using syndromic surveillance systems, only 9% of
local health departments were able to operate their
syndromic surveillance system without state oversight
[14–16]. These prior studies also highlight the impact
of the lack of guidance regarding syndromic surveil-
lance use, and how resource limitations contributed
to the relative inability to create standard protocols to
provide such direction [26]. Our study conveys a
similar message, in that we observed strong differ-
ences in effect of the study’s intervention and how
public health response patterns vary by population
size served by health agencies and over time despite
attempts to provide standardization by way of partici-
patory intervention development.
Our intervention significantly decreased the number
of responses in intervention versus control LPHAs in
the first year but less in the second year of the study. In
the first year, the intervention LPHAs were significantly
less likely to report the findings to external agencies.
This effect was not seen in year 2. This finding was
unexpected and the reasons for the change are unclear.
It could be due to a number of factors including; the
introduction of new practices from the intervention
protocol (an initial Hawthorne effect), the impact of the
ice storm and disruption in year 1, or the higher number
of alerts due to a more severe influenza season in year 2.
In the post study interviews, LPHA staff reported no
differences in their practice over time but they may not
have been aware of minor subtle changes. More work is
required to assess the reasons for this finding.
The interaction of the year of the study with the
response to new versus sustained alerts appears to be
mainly related to the process of “watchful waiting”. In
the first year and with the exception of “watchful wait-
ing”, LPHAs were more likely to respond to sustained
alerts. In the post-study interviews, many staff reported
that they would wait for a repeat alert before treating it
seriously. They would implement “watchful waiting” for
the first alert. In the second year, the responses were
more likely to occur to first alerts but, on examination,
most of this is driven by the outcome of “watchful wait-
ing”. Using a direct test for statistical interaction, only
the outcome of “all responses other than ‘watchful wait-
ing’” had no statistical interaction to the year of the
study (p = 0.86).
Implications
The large confidence limits around all the logistic re-
gression estimates for medium and small LPHAs in
Table 4 raises the question about the minimum size of a
health unit that can be served by syndromic surveillance,
regardless of the provision of standardized supports such
as algorithms and protocols. This was supported by the
observations that small LPHAs, serving populations of
Table 5 Post-hoc multivariable logistic regression models that account for repeated measures assessing the association between
specified predictor variables, including the variable of whether or not syndromic surveillance was a primary data source on
outcomes related to the likelihood of taking a public health response to emergency department syndromic surveillance alerts by
year within the study
Outcomes
(Odds Ratio, 95% Confidence Interval)
Any response including watchful waiting Any response excluding watchful waiting
Intervention Year 1 0.020 (<0.01, 0.18)a 0.41 (0.06, 2.78)
Year 2 0.18 (0.016, 2.12) 0.72 (0.18, 3.00)
Control Reference Reference
Medium LPHA Year 1 0.38 (0.02, 7.33) 0.79 (0.06, 10.2)
Year 2 0.21 (0.01, 5.41) 0.52 (0.08, 3.44)
Large LPHA Reference Reference
Small LPHA Year 1 1.12 (0.01, 12.7) 1.30 (0.14, 11.9)
Year 2 2.49 (0.16, 39.1) 0.47 (0.09, 2.43)
Large LPHA Reference Reference
Sustained alert Year 1 1.87 (1.13,3.08)a 2.07 (1.24, 3.46)a
Year 2 0.24 (0.16, 0.35)a 0.92 (0.61, 1.39)
New alert Reference Reference
Views syndromic surveillance as a primary data source Year 1 47.5 (4.2, 536)a 2.10 (0.26, 16.6)
Year 2 3.86 (0.28, 52.9) 0.60 (0.12, 2.88)
Secondary Reference Reference
aStatistically significant result
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less than 150,000, had limited resources to create re-
sponse protocols and respond to syndromic alerts. The
lower number of visits per day and reliance on one
hospital created potentially statistically unstable data on
which the syndromic alerts are based. This combination
of lower staffing and unstable data generated challenges
in interpreting the statistical and public health signifi-
cance of aberrant events. These factors indicate the need
to consider the minimum resources needed for the
implementation of syndromic surveillance systems. A
different approach is taken in England, where a standard
protocol to assess all alerts is implemented by a central
team [32]. Only alerts that meet selected criteria are
passed on the local public health agencies, thereby limit-
ing the amount of time and effort involved to complete
such local investigations.
The failure to detect any outbreaks or consistently pre-
dict the onset of the influenza season supports the find-
ings of Beuhler et al. [15]. Rather, syndromic surveillance
is often listed as being useful in assessing the health im-
pact of influenza on a community. Given the high number
of alerts, the lower rates of response to these alerts by the
LPHAs in the intervention group can be interpreted as
them being more discriminating and thus more efficient.
The variation is the designation of alerts warranting
public health action was unexpected, and was observed
in both the intervention and control arm LPHAs. Given
the mismatch between the reported actions in the free
text fields and the answer to the question about the alert
as warranting a public health response, we question how
LPHA defined “assessment of public health significance”.
“Watchful waiting” was given as the response to one
third of all syndromic alerts and it was most commonly
associated with a new alert. The research team listed
watchful waiting separately since, while LPHA staff
considered it as part of situational awareness, it did not
meet the study definition of effective use (Fig. 1). The
implementation of standard protocols reduced the rates
of “watchful waiting” (Table 4). Comments from partici-
pating LPHA staff in semi-structured interviews indi-
cated that they would wait to see if an alert was
sustained before taking an action other than “watchful
waiting”. Such comments indicate a paradox of syn-
dromic surveillance, where high sensitivity and real-time
analysis to detect local aberrant events must be balanced
with sensitive systems that generate a large number of
false positive alerts. According to the findings of this
study, it may increase the practice of waiting for re-
peated alerts or other changes in response protocols to
order to meet resource constraints.
Strengths and limitations
The strengths of the study are its prospective evaluation of
syndromic surveillance in real-world public health settings
for 16 months and spanning two respiratory disease sea-
sons. The study also used an integrated knowledge transla-
tion approach where local public health communicable
disease staff were actively involved in the intervention de-
velopment, implementation, and evaluation process. In
addition, the cluster-randomized experimental study design
is a strong design for this type of evaluation. There was
high retention with only one LPHA dropping out of the
study. Evaluation of the intervention’s implementation and
fidelity indicated that there were no evidence of contamin-
ation in that the LPHAs in the control arm reported no
changes to their practices over the duration of the study.
The study has several limitations. The disruption to
syndromic surveillance systems due to the ice storm
over the winter in 2013 created challenges. In addition
to requiring an extension of the study, it may also have
sensitized the study participants to be increasingly aware
of system disruptions for the rest of the study period. In
particular, we note the higher number of alerts investi-
gated for system disruptions in year 1. Regression
models were repeated separately for year1 and year 2 in
order to assess this potential bias and no major differ-
ences in the models were noted. A further limitation
was the necessity to use repeated measures in the statis-
tical models in order to account for variation between
the participating LPHAs. This resulted in a decline in
statistical power and possible explanation of non-
significant results. Another challenge is that LPHA staff
who reported in the logbooks may have “copied-and-
pasted” their logbook entries due to resource limitations.
As a result, it is possible that the logbook data may not
reflect the actual actions taken. However, it was not feas-
ible for the research team to observe and verify the
validity of information captured in the logbook entries,
aside from conducting semi-structured interviews to
probe for findings that corroborate the results. A final
limitation is that the study only examined respiratory
and influenza-like illness syndromes in the Ontario,
Canada public health context, and external generaliza-
tions beyond this setting may be limited.
Conclusion
This study raises questions about the effectiveness of using
standardized protocols to improve the performance of
syndromic surveillance in a decentralized public health
system. Despite efforts to create standardized protocols
and engage public health agencies in the process, no sig-
nificant differences in the effective use of syndromic alerts
were observed. The only significant change was a reduc-
tion in the practice of watchful waiting. The study also
raises questions about the minimum capacity of an agency
and minimum population size that are required for the ef-
fective use of syndromic surveillance.
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Appendix
Development of aberrant event detection algorithms
To determine the optimal aberrant event detection
method to implement as the study intervention algo-
rithm in LPHAs, several statistical methods and their
relative sensitivity and specificity were evaluated. In the
first step, we used regression models were used to
account for seasonality of day of the week effects, using
historical syndromic surveillance data received from
participating Ontario LPHAs jurisdictions for the time
period of September 1, 2010 to August 31, 2013. To
account for varying daily emergency department visit
volumes each day, the total count of these visits was used
as an offset in the appropriate regression models. Differ-
ences between observed number of events and expected
number of events estimated by regression models (the
residuals) were the main outcome from these models.
We then applied methods of statistical process control
to the residuals from these regression models. The stat-
istical process control methods used in this study in-
cluded the generalized version of the Early Aberration
Reporting System (EARS) [A1], the cumulative sum con-
trol chart method or CUSUM [A2], and unweighted
moving average (MA) and exponential weighted moving
average methods (EMA) [A3].
For the EARS method, instead of a weighting each obser-
vation equally with fixed threshold (h) and correction
parameter (k), the means and standard deviations are calcu-
lated with weighted observations and h and k were esti-
mated from data. For MA, means of a short moving
window (length S, prospective data) and a long moving
window (length L, historical data) are compared with a
threshold of h. While in EMA, the means and standard
deviations are calculated with exponential weights, weight-
ing later observations more than earlier observations.
Optimization of all Cusum and two moving average
models were done using simulated data. Based on histor-
ical trends and using Monte Carlo methods, increased
risks of 10, 15 and 20% were randomly added over a two
week period. Regression models and each statistical
process control method were repeated run in order to
estimate average run lengths (ARLs) and tuning parame-
ters for each algorithm. The process was repeated until
the parameters converged.
For the emergency department data, a linear regres-
sion model performed best. In order to assess which
statistical process control approach (EARS, CUSUM,
MA, or EMA) was best, the models for each algorithm
were assessed by examining the percent of simulated
outbreaks detected and the average run length to detect
the outbreak (ARL1). For these calculations, we used a
fixed average run length to have no outbreaks (ARL0).
In order to evaluate the performance of these statis-
tical process control methods (EARS, CUSUM, MA, or
EMA), data were simulated with similar characteristics
of the historical data with various magnitudes of rises
(10, 15 and 20%) in a 2-week period. In the simulations,
ARL0 (the average time between two (false) alerts when
the system is in control, i.e. no aberrations) and the
threshold (h) were fixed at preselected values. For ex-
ample, for the Cusum model, the ARL0 was predeter-
mined to be 150 days, considered the minimum time
between influenza seasons. The measures of ARL1 (aver-
age time the algorithm takes to alert when there are
aberrations in the system) and k (or S/L for MA and
EMA) were estimated and compared. By selecting the al-
gorithms with the highest percent of outbreaks de-
tected and lowest ARL1, nine potential detection
algorithms were selected for further consideration by
end-users – three for each of Cusum, moving average
and weighted moving average consisting of methods
with high sensitivity, low specificity; balanced sensitiv-
ity and specificity; low sensitivity and high specificity.
A tenth model (EARS) was also included.
The results of these 10 models were plotted and
discussed at a consensus meeting of the intervention
LPHAs. Using a nominal group technique {reference}, the
optional algorithm (in terms of sensitivity and specificity)
and the resultant parameters were chosen.
The successful model was as follows: Let Yt and Et be
the observed count and population size for day t, then







μt ¼ Xtβþ єt
ð1Þ
where μt is the modelled expected count for day t, which
depends on covariates Xt that include seasonality and
day of week effects and єt follows a normal distribution
with mean 0 and variance σ2.
The CUSUM model with a high specificity was the op-
timal detection method. The system alerts when
CUSUM exceeds a threshold value (h):
St ¼ max 0; St‐1 þ єt ‐k½  > h ð2Þ
Formula 2 is a classic CUSUM algorithm where a
CUSUM value (St) is non negative and S0 = 0, h is an
alert trigging threshold and k is a correction factor that
brings the CUSUM value closer to 0 at each run. These
two parameters together determine the two Average Run
Lengths (ARL0 and ARL1) concepts in process control
literature. For the algorithm, h was set to 2 and k was
set to 1.12 to achieve a ARL0 of 150 days and ARL1 of
7 days. A flag is generated when CUSUM value exceeds
threshold h on 2 consecutive days. During the study, the
CUSUM value was reset to zero after two flags on
consecutive days was reached.
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